Two Chokepoints and a Carbon Border

Trade policy is usually discussed in terms of tariffs and agreements. In 2026, three other forces are doing more to reshape trade flows across Europe, the Gulf, Türkiye and Central Asia:

  • two maritime chokepoints under pressure
  • a carbon border that now carries a price
  • a land corridor that is steadily gaining relevance

Each of them changes how contracts should be written.

Hormuz: a route under contest

Since the war involving Iran began on 28 February, the Strait of Hormuz has been the centre of the disruption. A memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad in June brought a brief reopening. Attacks on commercial tankers resumed in early July. October has seen the highest number of reported incidents since the conflict began.

Iran has declared restricted zones and designated routes, and vessels outside them risk being targeted. US forces have expanded escort operations through the southern part of the strait.

For shippers, the practical result is uncertainty rather than a clean closure. Transits continue but are irregular. Crews demand significantly higher pay. Insurance is expensive and conditional. Cargo is often moved in stages rather than on a single voyage.

The Red Sea: a second front

With Hormuz constrained, Saudi Arabia shifted a large share of its exports to its Red Sea ports. On 20 July the Houthis in Yemen declared a maritime blockade against Saudi-linked shipping. Several Saudi-linked tankers have since changed course or reported attacks. Saudi Arabia has responded with air strikes and has sought an international coalition to protect the route.

The Houthis say other shipping may pass. Many operators nonetheless treat the southern Red Sea as a risk zone. The two chokepoints are now linked: pressure on one raises the importance, and the vulnerability, of the other.

The carbon border: CBAM now has a price

The third force is regulatory rather than military. On 1 January 2026, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism moved from reporting into its definitive phase. EU importers of the following goods must now account for the emissions embedded in them:

  • iron and steel
  • aluminium
  • cement
  • fertilisers
  • hydrogen
  • electricity

Certificate sales open in February 2027, and the first surrender for 2026 imports is due by 30 September 2027.

Türkiye is the EU's largest steel supplier, so Turkish exporters are among the most exposed. Two details matter commercially. First, exporters that rely on EU default emission values usually face higher costs than those that provide verified installation data. Second, Türkiye has adopted its own Climate Law and published regulations for a national emissions trading system, with a pilot phase covering 2026 and 2027. Over time, carbon paid at home may reduce what is paid at the EU border.

Carbon data is therefore moving from a sustainability topic to a pricing input in commercial negotiations.

The Middle Corridor: gaining weight

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route runs from China and Central Asia through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian Sea, and on through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye. It continues to grow. Kazakhstan reported a 22% rise in cargo volumes on the route in the first eight months of 2026.

Capacity remains limited, and the route cannot replace maritime trade. It is, however, becoming a credible part of a diversified logistics strategy for Central Asian trade, including flows of European goods eastwards.

What this means for contracts

These developments call for several practical adjustments.

Choose the delivery point deliberately. In disrupted conditions, the party that controls the goods controls the risk. Where possible, experienced financiers prefer delivery into an independent bonded warehouse, with inspection before title passes. Long-voyage CIF commitments into contested waters are much harder to finance than they were.

Allocate freight, insurance and delay risk explicitly. War-risk premiums, rerouting, demurrage and price movement during transit should be priced and assigned in the contract. They should not be left to force majeure clauses after the event.

Treat carbon as a commercial term. For CBAM-covered goods, verified emissions data and responsibility for CBAM costs belong in the supply contract alongside price and quality.

Build route optionality. Where volumes allow, structures that can switch between ports, routes or transport modes are more resilient. Lenders increasingly reward that flexibility.

None of these forces is likely to disappear quickly. The companies that adapt their contracts now will find financing easier and counterparties more willing when conditions change again.

This article reflects publicly reported developments as of late October 2026 and is provided for general information.

Previous Post Next Post